Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights
Part Four: When Does a Human Become a Person?
by Francis J. Beckwith
In this final installment of my series on the arguments for abortion rights, I
will continue where I left off in the previous article with a critique of some
"decisive moment theories." In addition, I will make some brief comments
about the "gradualist" thesis. I will conclude with responses to common
questions about the pro-life view that full humanness begins at conception.
DECISIVE MOMENT THEORIES (CONTINUED)
Beginning of Brain Development
Some bioethicists, such as Baruch Brody, believe that full humanness
begins when the brain starts functioning, which can first be detected by the
electroencephalogram (EEG) at about 40 to 43 days after conception.[1]
(Although Brody has moral problems with abortion on demand prior to brain
functioning, this is not because he believes the unborn is fully human.)
Brody maintains that in order to decide when something is fully human, "we
must first see...what properties are such that their loss would mean the
going out of existence (the death) of a human being."[2] He concludes that
since at brain death a human being goes out of existence (at least in this
mortal realm), the presence of a functioning human brain is the property
which makes one fully human. Hence, it would only follow that the start of
brain functioning is the beginning of full humanness.
The fundamental difficulty with this argument "is that brain death indicates
the end of human life as we know it, the dead brain having no capacity to
revive itself. But the developing embryo has the natural capacity to bring
on the functioning of the brain."[3] That is to say, an entity's irreversible
absence of brain waves after the brain waves have come into existence
indicates that the entity no longer has the natural, inherent capacity to
function as a human being, since our current technology is incapable of
"reactivating" the brain. However, the unborn entity who has yet to reach
the stage in (his or) her development at which brain waves can be
detected, unlike the brain dead individual, possesses the inherent capacity
to have brain waves. She is like a patient with a temporarily flat EEG. "The
two stages of human life are, then, entirely different from the point of view
of brain functioning. The embryo contains the natural capacity to develop
all the human activities: perceiving, reasoning, willing and relating to
others. Death means the end of natural growth, the cessation of these
abilities."[4]
Brody responds to this criticism by presenting the following science-fiction
case:
Imagine that medical technology has reached the stage at which,
when brain death occurs, the brain is removed, "liquified," and
"recast" into a new functioning brain. The new brain bears no relation
to the old one (it has none of its memory traces, and so on). If the
new brain were put into the old body, would the same human being
exist or a new human being who made use of the body of the old
one? I am inclined to suppose the latter. But consider the entity
whose brain has died. Is he not like the fetus? Both have the
potential for developing into an entity with a functioning brain (we
shall call this a weak potential) but we can conclude, it seems to me,
that an entity can go out of existence even if it retains a weak
potential for having a functioning brain, and that, analogously, the
fetus is not a human being just because it has this weak potential.
What is essential for being human is the possession of the potential
for human activities that comes with having the structures required
for a functioning brain. It is this potential that the fetus acquires at
(or perhaps slightly before) the time that its brain starts functioning,
and it is this potential that the newly conceived fetus does not
have.[5]
I do not believe that this response succeeds. First, unlike the potential of
the corpse's dead brain to be liquified and recast as a new brain, the
unborn's potency to develop is within itself (intrinsic). "As in the case of
other organisms," philosopher A. Chadwick Ray points out, the unborn's
development "admittedly requires nourishment from outside and an
appropriate environment (consider parasites), but still, the fetus has within
itself the power to appropriate nourishment and grow." On the other hand,
the potential of Brody's corpse is utterly extrinsic. That is, "it can be acted
upon from the outside and brought to life, but without immediate surgery
its life will not be restored, and it will simply rot."[6]
Second, the unborn has "interests of itself, in a straightforward, non-projective way, that go beyond the interests of its component parts --
cells, tissues, etc.," just as I as a living organism have interests that go
beyond the interests of my component parts -- ears, nose, teeth, etc. On
the other hand, the corpse "has no interests beyond those of its parts. The
component cells may have an interest in continuing to live, but the corpse
itself has none." For example, "there would be no loss in the corpse's
organs, all being donated to different patients (imagine donating every
living cell if you prefer), whereas in a living fetus's being chopped up for
spare parts its own interests would be sacrificed."[7]
In summary, "the growth of the fetus is in its own interest and is the
realization of its intrinsic potential, in which realization its identity is
preserved." However, "the implanting of a new brain into a brainless corpse
would constitute the genesis of a new organism with its own new telos and
interests where there were none."[8] Therefore, since the prebrain-functioning unborn entity has a natural inherent capacity for brain
functioning while the corpse does not, they do not have the same kind of
weak potential that Brody claims they have.
Viability
As I noted in Part Three, viability is the time at which the unborn human
can live outside her mother's womb. Some have argued that prior to this
time, since the unborn cannot survive independent of her mother, she is
not a completely independent human life and hence not fully human.
Bioethicist Andrew Varga points out a number of problems with the viability
criterion. First, "how does viability transform the nature of the fetus so
that the non-human being then turns into a human being?" That is to say,
viability is a measure of the sophistication of our neonatal life-support
systems. Humanity remains the same, but viability changes. Viability
measures medical technology, not one's humanity.
Second, "is viability not just an extrinsic criterion imposed upon the fetus
by some members of society who simply declare that the fetus will be
accepted at that moment as a human being?"[9] In other words, the
viability criterion seems to be arbitrary and not applicable to the question
of whether the unborn is fully human, since it relates more to the location
and dependency of the unborn than to any essential change in her state of
being. This criterion only tells us when certain members of our society want
to accept the humanity of the unborn.
And third, "the time of viability cannot be determined precisely, and this
fact would create great practical problems for those who hold this
opinion."[10] For example, in 1973, when the Supreme Court legalized
abortion, viability was at about twenty-four weeks. But now babies have
survived 20 weeks after conception. This, of course, puts the pro-abortionist in a morally difficult situation. For some health care facilities
are killing viable babies by abortion in one room while in another room
heroically trying to save premature infants (preemies). It seems only
logical that if the 21-week-old preemie is fully human, then so is the 28-week-old unborn who can be legally killed by abortion. This is why
philosopher Jane English, who is a moderate on the abortion issue (i.e., her
position does not fit well into either the pro-life or pro-choice camp,
although she seems closer to the latter), has asserted that "the similarity
of a fetus to a baby is very significant. A fetus one week before birth is so
much like a newborn baby in our psychological space that we cannot allow
any cavalier treatment of the former while expecting full sympathy and
nurturative support for the latter...An early horror story from New York
about nursers who were expected to alternate between caring for six-month
premature infants and disposing of viable 24-week aborted fetuses is just
that -- a horror story." English writes that "these beings are so much alike
that no one can be asked to draw a disti